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THE DUTY OF POSSESSORS OF LAND IN WISCONSIN
TO LICENSEES, SOCIAL GUESTS AND
BUSINESS GUESTS
A mere licensee coming upon the land of another must take the
premises as he finds them. But the possessor of land owes a licensee
a duty to warn him of dangerous conditions of which the possessor
knows and which are not obvious or otherwise known to the licensee.
Also, the occupant of the premises must refrain from active negligence
towards a licensee.1
Thus, in the case of Muench v. Heinenannj,2 recovery for injury
was denied when a pulley fell while the plaintiff was using an elevator.
The plaintiff had been permitted to enter the defendant's building to
distribute milk to the latter's employees. It was decided that the mere
fact that the plaintiff was accustomed to use the elevator either by
direction or permission did not alter his position as a mere licensee.
But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that the omission to
observe and repair a loose plank over a steam pit contained in a
breakwater constituted active negligence on the part of a railroad to
a licensee.3 The plaintiff was held a licensee because he was using the
breakwater as a footpath and as a member of the public which long
had been permitted to use it in such a manner. The condition of the
place made the pit a dangerous trap to persons on the premises. To a
mere licensee there is no duty to repair traps or pitfalls unless the
possessor has knowledge of them. Here, the court said that there was
a duty to discover the pitfall. Such a duty is not ordinarily imposed
in favor of a mere licensee. However, the condition was in existence
for some time and the defendant railroad probably could be presumed
to have had knowledge of the defect. The licensor is bound not to
render the premises more dangerous without notifying the licensee of
such increased danger or, at least, giving warning of such conditions
reasonably calculated to reach the licensee.4
Tolerated trespassers are put on the plane of licensees whose pres-
ence the land occupier is under a duty to anticipate if he knows they
are likely to come on the premises at a given time and place, and
especially does this duty exist if the occupier is engaged in an activity
dangerous to life or limb.5 Such trespassers crossing the defendant's
railroad tracks at an unauthorized place, but which long had been
I Brinilson v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 144 Wis. 614, 129 N.W.
664 (1911).
2 119 Wis. 441, 96 N.W. 800 (1903). But see Safe Place Statute, Wis. STAT.
(1939) § 101.06.3 Supra note 1.
4 Taylor v. Northern Coal & Dock Co., 161 Wis. 223, 152 N.W. 465 (1915).
5 Davis v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co., 58 Wis. 646, 17 N.W. 406(1883).
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used as a crossing, were treated as licensees in Johnson v. Lake Supe-
rior Terminal and Transfer Co.6 In that case a train was being backed,
and for that reason the engineer could not keep as effective a lookout
as when the train was being pulled. But there was a duty, the court
held, to keep a careful lookout for persons likely to be on the track.
Because of the reversed direction of the train compliance with this duty
required a lookout in addition to the members of the engine crew. Fail-
ure to provide such lookout was a violation of duty to a tolerated tres-
passer run down by the train.
But when a licensee goes beyond the scope of his license he becomes
a trespasser as to whom there is no duty to make the premises safe and
no duty to warn of danger in a place where his presence is not
expected. Thus, an employee of a contractor working on the outside of
a building, and who, during the noon hour for his own amusement
wandered through the building and was injured while using an eleva-
tor, was held to be a trespasser towards whom the defendant had
violated no duty.7
Trespassing children have sometimes been regarded as "invitees"
by reason of the fact that they were lured to the premises because of
some attractive but dangerous condition upon them. In many jurisdic-
tions, including Wisconsin, such trespassing children have been given
special consideration not accorded to adult trespassers. "He who main-
tains an object or condition liable to attract children of tender years to
interfere therewith, under such circumstances as to be chargeable with
knowledge that they may probably so interfere, to their personal injury,
breaches his duty as to ordinary care not to imperil their safety.",
But the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not applied the attractive nui-
sance doctrine to all situations involving danger to children. Thus,
where a nine-year-old boy was injured while playing brakeman on
roalroad cars the court said: "We do not consider that a train of rail-
road cars on a track can be classed with turntables and like machinery
as alluring and attractive to children, so as to put the burden on rail-
road companies to carefully guard them against dangers."9 The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has refused to apply the doctrine in the case
of a raft in a municipal pond.'0 And in Bonniwell v. Milwaukee Light,
Heat and Traction Co.,:' where an eleven-year-old boy was electrocuted
after climbing to the top of a tower carrying high voltage current, it
686 Wis. 64, 56 N.W. 161 (1893).
7 Klemens v. Morrow Milling Co., 171 Wis. 614, 177 N.W. 903 (1920).
8 Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin Railroad Co., 152 Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60 (1913);
Meyer v. Menominee and Marinette L. & T. Co., 151 Wis. 279, 138 N.W. 1008
(1912).
9 Wendorf v. Director General of R. R., 173 Wis. 53, 180 N.W. 128 (1920).
1o Fiel v. Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 233 N.W. 611 (1930).
xi 174 Wis. 1, 182 N.W. 468 (1921).
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was held that no duty had been violated by the electric company, since
it was not reasonably to- be anticipated that a trespassing child would
get into such a position of danger, and since furthermore the danger
was obvious to a child of eleven years.
In so far as there exists a special duty with respect to trespassing
children, such duty is based predominantly on the fact that certain
hazards cannot be appreciated by children of tender years. Any allur-
ing features which the hazardous condition may possess are significant
chiefly to the extent that they give to the defendant reason to expect
the presence of children, and, as has been noted, even adult trespassers
are entitled to special consideration when their presence in a given
zone of danger is known to the possessor of the premises.
Generally, a person who comes upon the premises of another as a
social guest is said to be on a slightly higher plane that that of a mere
licensee. But although the visit may be of "mutual" advantage to the
parties, the law does not regard the benefit or advantage incident to
such social relations as sufficient basis for the imposition of affirmative
legal obligations. The guest need only be warned of concealed hazards
of which the host has knowledge and which he realizes constitute un-
reasonable risks. The host must not be guilty of any misfeasance after
his guest has come upon the premises; but there is no affirmative obli-
gation to use care to discover defects in the premises or repair them for
the safety of the gratuitous visitor.' 2
In the widely discussed case of Greenfield v. Miller,13 the Wisconsin
court said that the relationship of .host and guest was that of licensor
and licensee. The plaintiff, who had been invited to spend two days
at the recently finished home of the defendant, slipped on a small rug
placed on a highly polished floor. The plaintiff had contended that it
was the duty of the defendant to have warned her of the slippery con-
dition of the floor or to have fastened the rugs so that they would not
slip. The court directed a verdict for the defendant and, on appeal,
the judgment was affirmed. The court said: "Where a guest is invited
to come onto the premises of the host for social or benevolent purposes
only, the relation thus created is one of licensor and licensee and the
rule of ordinary care does not apply."
In Gorr v. Mittlestadt"4 the plaintiff, pursuant to an invitation,
express or implied, drove up the driveway of the defendant's premises,
as was his custom, in a carriage drawn by one horse. The driveway was
situated twenty feet from an open cellar, the intervening space being
occupied by a grass plot and piles of stones. The horse became fright-
'
2 HARPER, LAW OF TORTS, Section 96.
13 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834, 12 A.L.R. 982 (1921).
1496 Wis. 296, 71 N.W. 656 (1897).
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ened and backed up until the carriage, its occupants and the horse were
thrown into the cellar. It was held that a verdict should have been
directed for the defendant. Said the court: "In the case of a mere per-
mission by one for another to use his premises, no duty to guard the
latter from danger of personal injury exists. Such permission only
gives a right to enjoy the premises for such use as the licensee finds
them. But where the owner of land invites another expressly or by
implication to come upon his land, as by passing over a private way
thereon, a different rule applies. He owes to such other the positive
duty to use ordinary care to maintain such way in a reasonably safe
condition for such use by persons in the exercise of ordinary care."
The plaintiff was considered to be out of the class mentioned in the
quotation. He was not within the customarily traveled way when the
injury occurred.
The possessor of lands owes the highest duty to those persons who
come upon the premises in the capacity of a business guest. Here,
emphasis is placed upon the mutual benefit derived from the relation-
ship. The possessor is bound to use ordinary care in keeping the usual
space for business safe for the access of all persons exercising ordinary
care in coming there at seasonable hours by invitation, express or im-
plied, or for any purpose beneficial to the possessor.' 5 Persons included
in this class are: customers in shops, patrons in banks, patrons in res-
taurants, persons attending public exhibitions, workmen called to per-
form work by the possessor of the premises, and employees.'1 6
The case of Hupfer v. National Distilling Co.' 7 is an excellent illus-
tration of the duty owing a business visitor. While the plaintiff was
standing upon a platform stirring slop preparatory to letting it run into
a container which he brought to cart home his purchase, the vat con-
taining the slop burst and he was scalded. Although the defendant had
a regular employee whose duty it was to stir the slops, it had been the
practice to allow the customers to do their own stirring. The defendant
contended that the plaintiff was a mere licensee and that there was
no duty to make the premises safe or discover any defect in the vat.
In giving judgment to the plaintiff, the court said that mere permission
or license does not imply invitation. When that fact alone appears, the
permitted person is a mere licensee. But when it is shown that the per-
mitted person enters on the premises in the ordinary way to transact
business with the licensor, or when the object of his visit is one in
which there is mutuality of interest, he is a business guest. The court
further said that the plaintiff was lured into the place of danger by
15 Borowski v. Schulz, 112 Wis. 415, 88 N.W. 236 (1901).
LO Supra note 12, Section 98.
17 114 Wis. 279, 90 N.W. 191, 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 359 (1902).
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reason of his business with the defendant and he was still in the posi-
tion of a business guest when he was stirring the slop. And the Wis-
consin court has held that a plaintiff was entitled to be treated as a
business guest in an action against a defendant as to whom there was
no mutuality of interest. A coal dealer left a hole uncovered after
delivering coal in a garage of which the plaintiff was a customer. The
coal dealer was held liable to the plaintiff who was injured when he
fell into the hole as he was entering the garage.:'
In Lehman v. Amsterdam Coffee Co.1' a storekeeper was held liable
for injuries sustained by a customer. There the plaintiff customer, at
dusk, was examining merchandise located in the storage part of the
store under an implied or express invitation. While so doing, she was
injured when she fell down a stairway which was visible only from the
rear of the room. In the decision it was pointed out that an open stair-
way or hatchway in the storage part ordinarily cannot be called a trap
or snare but that, in this situation, it might well be said that it was a
trap or snare of whose existence under the circumstances the rules of
ordinary care would require that an invited person be warned.
It must be noted, however, that the possessor of the premises does
not insure the safety of the business guest when he goes to a part of the
premises not considered to be necessary for the transaction of the busi-
ness involved. A contractor who was in a building for the purpose
of making a bid on plastering certain unfinished rooms was held to have
exceeded his invitation and gone beyond the scope of his business when
he thrust his head or hands through a window into an elevator shaft.20
Employees are related in such a manner to their employers that
they can be classified in the group of business guests. However, section
101.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes, commonly known as the safe-place
statute, lays down the degree of care required of employers. The statute
requires that the employer make the premises safe for the performance
of acts which he knows or reasonably should know are going to be
performed there."
LEROY J. GONRING.
18 Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771 (1927).
'9 146 Wis. 213, 131 N.W. 362 (1911).2 0 Peake v. Buell, 90 Wis. 508, 63 N.W. 1053, 48 Am. St. Rep. 946 (1895).
21 Neitzke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc., 214 Wis. 441, 253 N.W. 579 (1934);
Mullen v. Larson-Morgan Co., 212 Wis. 52, 249 N.W. 67 (1933); Sandeen v.
Willow River Power Co., 214 Wis. 166, 252 N.W. 706 (1934); Cermak v.
Milwaukee Air Pump Co., 192 Wis. 44, 211 N.W. 354 (1927) ; See also, The
Wisconsin Safe Place Statute, Wis. LAw REv., Vol. 1939 P. 314.
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